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1. Introduction
Housing subsidies, currently in force in theincome tax legislation of many
countries, are the focus of a longstanding debate among academics and po-
licy makers. They have been criticized for several reasons. Some authors,
e.g., Laidler (1969), Gahvari (1984, 1985), Hamilton and Whalley (1985),
Poterba (1992) and Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) consider that these sub-
sidies induce homeowners to over-consume housing services. According to
Skinner (1996), tax subsidies on owner-occupied housing deliver a wind-
fall bonus to existing homeowners at the expense of future generations,
which have large efficiency costs. In turn, Gervais (2002) shows that indi-
viduals prefer to live in a world without housing subsidies. Other authors,
such as Feldstein (1982), Poterba (1984), Zubiri (1990) and López-García
(2004), see little efficiency gains from subsidies since they are completely
transferred from buyers to sellers through increases in prices. Also, Rosen
(1985) argues that subsidies do not induce the acquisition of a first neces-
sity good properly, since it means discriminatory protection against those
that have lower income and consequently need to be helped. 
On the other hand, several authors favor the use of housing subsidies.
Cremer and Gahvari (1998) prove that the differential tax treatment of
housing may be justified on grounds of optimal tax policy, creating the con-
ditions under which consumption of housing by the poor must be subsi-
dized. Also Nakagami and Pereira (1995) show that first-time home buy-
ers would suffer great utility loss from the elimination of mortgage-interest
deductibility.
The aim of thepresent paper is to study theoptimality of including ahous-
ing allowance in the income tax. Two different approaches can be consi-
dered. On the one hand, we have the theory of optimal taxation, which has
formalized the design of a tax system that maximizes social welfare; see,
e.g., Mirrlees (1971), Sheshinski (1972), Atkinson (1970), Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) and Slemrod (1994). The resulting optimal tax system takes
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ferees of this journal for detailed comments. Any errors are my own.account of the trade-off between efficiency and a more equal distribution
of wealth. However, these models working with heterogeneous agents re-
present a highly simplified economy.
On the other hand, there are dynamic macroeconomic models that exa-
mine the effect of a certain tax change on the steady state utility of a re-
presentative agent, as in (Turnovsky – Okuyama, 1994). The main concern
of these models is to analyze the effect of a favorable tax treatment to hous-
ing on the stock of housing. In other words, they are concerned about the ef-
ficiency of the housing allowance, but not about its equity. 
Our objective is to improve previous models on two main grounds. First,
instead of the classic static optimal-tax model we use an infinite-horizon
model following Turnovsky and Okuyama (1994). Second, we introduce 
equity objectives that are usually absent in dynamic macroeconomic models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid out in
Section 2. The optimal linear income tax and the optimal subsidy on hous-
ing are presented in Section 3. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
The production side is as simple as possible. Labor is used in this eco-
nomy to produce a good (considered the numeraire commodity) that is con-
sumed, and the stock of housing that is used to produce housing services.
We assume that all the stock of housing is residential and owner-occupied.
The economy consists of a number of infinitely-lived individuals that are
equal in all regards except for their ability, represented by w (individual
ability). The utility function has the usual concavity properties. Individu-
als decide the number of hours they want to work, their consumption of
both the numeraire good and the housing services, and their accumulation
of housing stock and government bonds, in order to maximize their utility
subject to the budget constraint. On the other side, the government de-
cides thestructure of aprogressive linear income tax that maximizes theso-
cial welfare function subject to the revenue constraint consisting of three
elements: the minimum guaranteed income, the marginal tax rate, and
the rate of subsidy on housing.1




 tU(Ct, Lt, Ht) UC>0, UL<0, UH>0 (1.a)
where:
U = utility function,
C = per capita consumption of the non-housing good,
L = per capita labour supply,
H = per capita consumption of housing services,
  = consumer rate of time preference,
 U UC = –––,
 C
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1 Notice that a linear income tax with a minimum guaranteed income is progressive because
the average tax rate increases with income. U UL = –––,
 L
 U UH = –––;
 H
subject to:
PtHt + (bt+1 – bt) + Ct + (1– ) (ht+1 – ht) = [wLt + rht ht + rtbt] (1– ) + Gt
Ct   0,       1   Lt   0 (1.b)
with the initial conditions:
b(0) = b0h(0) = h0 (1.c)
where:
P = (imputed) price of housing services, in terms of the numeraire good,
b = per capita stock of government bonds, denominated in terms of the nu-
meraire good,
  = rate of subsidy on housing,
h = per capita stock of housing,
w = individual ability,
rh = real rental rate on housing,
r = real rate of return of government bonds,
  = marginal tax rate,
G = minimum guaranteed income.
Equation (1.b) states that individuals spend their after-tax income from
labor, bonds and housing stock, plus the government’s minimum guaran-
teed income, on housing services, consumption, and accumulation of bonds
and of housing stock. 
Solving the intertemporal optimization problem defined in equa-
tions (1.a) to (1.c) we obtain the following optimality conditions: 
UC =   (2.a) 
UL + w(1 –  )UC = 0 (2.b)
UH ––– = P (2.c)
UC
rht = rt (1– ) (2.d) 
where   , the costate variable associated with the accumulation equa-
tion (1.b) is the marginal utility of wealth measured in terms of the nu-
meraire commodity. Equation (2.a) equals the marginal utility of con-
sumption of the numeraire good to the marginal utility of wealth.
Equation (2.b) defines the labor supply, where there is a critical wage w0
such that:
LT > 0 when w   w0 (2.e)
LT > 0 when w   w0
Equation (2.c) can be interpreted as defining the price of housing ser-
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consumption. Finally, equation (2.d) equals the rate of return of the hous-
ing stock to the interest rate of bonds taking into account the subsidy on
housing. 
We assume that housing services (H) are produced using housing stock
(h) with a linear technology: 
Ht =  ht
Equilibrium pricing requires that:
 H –––– Pt – rht = 0 ⇔
 h
 Pt = rht
i.e., the marginal income of housing services equals the marginal cost of
housing services.
Without loss of generality we assume   =1   so that:
Ht = ht (2.f) 
Pt = rht (2.g)
Pt Ht = rht ht (2.h)
In addition, the following transversality conditions must hold:
limt→∞  tUcht+1 = limt→∞  tUcbt+1 = 0 (2.i) 
On the other hand, on the production side we assume constant prices
and the absence of profits. We denote the government revenue per capita




CtdF + R0 +  
∞
w




where F is the density function.
We assume  
∞
w
dF = 1. Using constraint (1.b), (2.j) can be rewritten as:
R0 + G +  
∞
w
[ (ht+1 – ht) + rtbt]dF =  
∞
w
[ (wLt + rhtht + rtbt) + (bt+1 – bt)]dF
(2.k) 
which is the usual government budget constraint, where the revenue from
taxes and government bonds must equal expenditure.
Finally, we assume a continuously balanced budget 
bt+1 = bt (2.l) 
so that the government constraint becomes:
R0 + G +  
∞
w
[ (ht+1 – ht) + rtbt]dF =  
∞
w
[ (wLt + rhtht + rtbt)dF (2.m)
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true at all times, and jointly determines Ct, Ht, Lt, ht+1, Pt, rt, rht and  t; see
Appendix A. From there, the steady-state equilibrium is attained when 
 t =  t+1 and ht = ht+1, determining the steady-state values of C, H, L, h, P,
r, rh, and  . 
3. Government Taxing Decisions
In this section the government decides the structure of a linear pro-
gressive income tax, i.e. a minimum guaranteed income, a marginal tax
rate, and the subsidy on housing. Therefore, we are generalizing the cur-
rent standard model of the optimal linear income tax to include the deci-
sion of fixing a certain subsidy on housing. In addition, we have extended
the standard model to include the effect that the marginal tax rate may
have on the real rate of return of government bonds and the real rate of
return of the per capita stock of housing.







where V is the indirect utility function, subject to:
R0 + G + ~ r 
∞
w 





L + ~ r (1 –  )
~
H + ~ rb]dF (3.b)




w  [ 
~
(V) +  ( [w
~
L + ~ r (1 –  )
~
H + ~ rb] – R0 – G – ~ rb)]dF (3.c)
from which we can derive the first-order conditions with respect to G,
  and  :  






w    
~
 ––– +  ( [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––] – 1) dF = 0 (4.a)
 G  G  G






w    
~
 ––– +  ([w
~
L + ~ r (1 –  )
~
H + ~ rb] +  [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––] +
        
 ~ r  ~ r +   ––– [b + (1 –  )
~
H] – b –– ) dF = 0 (4.b)
     






w    
~
 ––– +  ( [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) ––– – ~ r
~
H]) dF = 0 (4.c)
        







w    
~
 –– +  [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––] – 1) dF = 0 (5.a)    M  M






w   (– 
~
 –– + 1) Z +  [w(– wSLL – Z –––) + ~ r (1 –  ) [~ r (1 –  )SHH – Z –––]+    M  M
 ~ r  ~ r + –– b + (1 –  )
~
H] – b –– ) dF = 0 (5.b)







w    
~
 ––   ~ r
~
H +  [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) ––– – ~ r
~
H] dF = 0 (5.c)        
 V
where M = rb + G, ––– =   and Z = w
~




We now define B to be the net social marginal valuation of income, mea-
sured in terms of government revenue, and modified to include the effect
of the increase in income on the housing stock. That is, B measures the be-
nefit from transferring one monetary unit to the household, allowing for
the marginal tax paid on this extra monetary unit.




H B =  
~
  –– +   [w ––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––     M  M












B is the mean value of B.




~ r(1– ) ~ r  
~ r  
∞
W [(B–1)Z+ [–––  LL – ––––– 
~
H HH – –––  r  (b+(1– )
~
H)] + b –– dF = 0
1–  1–  1–    
(1– )w
where  LL =  SLL ––––––– is the compensated wage elasticity of labor,  ~
L
r(1– )(1– )  HH = SHH –––––––––– is the compensated price elasticity of housing, and ~
H
 
~ r (1– )  r  = –– ––––– is the tax-rate elasticity of the interest rate, all of these
   ~ r
expressed in wage-equivalent units and SLL, SHHare thesubstitution terms.
SLLis thecompensated response of labor to thenet wage and SHHis thecom-
pensated response of housing demand to its net price.
Finally (5.b) and (5.c) become: 
 
~ r
-cov(Z, B) –  
∞
W  b–– dF
    
–––– = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– (6.b)




L LL – ~ r(1 –  )
~
H HH – ~ r(b+(1– )
~
H) r  dF






w    
~
 ––  ~ r
~
H +  ~ r(1 –  ) –––  dF =   
∞
w  ~ r
~
H – w ––– dF (6.c)        
Condition (6.a) can be interpreted as in themodel of Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980). It states that the minimum guaranteed income should be adjusted
in such a way that the net social valuation of income B should, on ave-
rage, be equal to its cost (one monetary unit).
In turn, condition (6b) determines the optimal tax rate and can be com-










In our model cov(w
~
L + ~ rb + ~ r(1 –  )
~





L + ~ rb + ~ r(1 –  )
~
H and not w
~
L is pre-tax income, given that we have in-
troduced government bonds and housing in the original model. We can in-
terpret the covariance as a marginal measure of inequality. The greater
the inequality aversion is, the higher the marginal tax rate will be. When
there is no aversion to inequality, cov(w
~
L + ~ rb + ~ r(1 –  )
~
H, B) will be zero
and the marginal tax rate will be zero as well.
The second term that appears in the numerator of equation (6.b) is new.
It can be interpreted as the disincentive the government has to increase
marginal tax rates when the interest rate depends on the tax rate as in
our model. When the government raises the tax rate, the interest rate and
government debt increase.
The denominator is also modified. In theAtkinson-Stiglitz version thede-
nominator is the compensated labor-supply elasticity weighted by labor in-
come. In our version we also include the compensated price elasticity of
housing weighted by housing expenditure, and the tax-rate elasticity of
the interest rate weighted by the expenditure on government bonds and
housing expenditure. The compensated price elasticity of housing tends to
reduce the marginal tax rate. An increase in the tax rate raises the price
of housing, reducing the investment in housing stock and consequently
the government’s income. On the other hand, the tax-rate elasticity of
the interest rate will increase the marginal tax rate. This is due to the fact
that an increase in the tax rate will increase the interest rate as well as
government revenue coming from income taxation. This equation shows
that the decision about the optimal progressivity of the income tax must
take into account efficiency effects other than thelabor-supply effect. Anin-
crease in the tax rate will probably have effects on the interest rate that
we cannot ignore.
Finally, condition (6.c) tells us that the optimal value for the deduction  
is such that the social marginal benefit from increasing the subsidy on
housing must be equal to its marginal cost. The marginal benefit appears
on the left-hand side of the equation and consists of two elements. The first
one is the increase in the consumer’s utility due to a reduction in the price
of per capita housing services. The second one is extra revenue collected
because individuals raise their per capita stock of housing and pay more
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crease in government revenue because the real rate of return of the per
capita stock of housing has decreased, and the decrease in government re-
venue due to the fact that per capita labor supply will be lower. 
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed an optimal linear tax with a subsidy on hous-
ing. Some motivation for this analysis has been provided by the major con-
troversy that has emerged about whether a subsidy on housing should be
included in the income tax and its effects. The novelty of this analysis is
the inclusion of dynamic effects that were absent in previous optimal li-
near income-tax models. In particular, with regard to macroeconomic mo-
dels such as Turnovsky and Okuyama (1994) that examine the effect of
a certain tax change on the steady state utility of a representative agent,
we have introduced here heterogeneous agents as well as equity objectives,
which are absent in that literature.
The discussion suggests that when a more complex economy is consi-
dered new efficiency effects from increasing the marginal tax rate or
the subsidy on housing appear that should be taken into account:
– First of all, we have the disincentive of the government to increase
marginal tax rates when the interest rate depends on the tax rate in our
model. When the government raises the tax rate, the interest rate and
government debt increase.
– Secondly, the compensated price elasticity of housing tends to reduce
the marginal tax rate because an increase in the tax rate raises the price
of housing, reducing investment in housing stock and consequently
the government’s income.
– On the other hand, the tax-rate elasticity of the interest rate will in-
crease the marginal tax rate. This is due to the fact that an increase in
the tax rate will increase the interest rate as well as government reve-
nue coming from income taxation.
– The marginal benefit from the housing subsidy consists of two elements:
the increase in the consumer’s utility due to a reduction in the price of
per capita housing services, and the extra revenue collected because in-
dividuals raise their per capita stock of housing and pay more income
taxes on it.
– Finally, the marginal cost also consists of two elements: the decrease in
government revenue because the real rate of return of the per capita
stock of housing is smaller and the decrease in government revenue due
to the fact that the per capita labor supply will be lower.
As should be obvious, the importance of all these efficiency effects de-
pends on their compensated elasticity, but they should not be discarded
a priori.
To  conclude, it goes without saying that the analysis is still based on
many restrictive assumptions. We have considered that there is a nu-
meraire commodity that can be used for consumption or alternatively as
a stock of housing to produce housing services. A possible way to improve
themodel could be by introducing two different goods in theeconomy: hous-
442 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 9-10ing and a composite good, which we could call non-housing, as well as two
productive sectors: the housing and the non-housing sectors. This would
probably allow us to see the effect of the subsidy on housing on the price
of housing services, which is one of the most discussed effects of the hous-
ing subsidy. 
Appendix A
The macroeconomic equilibrium consists of the following set of equations that holds
at all times and jointly determines Ct, Ht, Lt, ht+1, Pt, rt, rht and  t:
UC =  t (A1.a)
UL + w(1 –  )UC = 0 (A1.b)
UH ––– = Pt (A1.c) UC
rht = rt (1–  ) (A1.d)
– t +   t+1 [1 + rt+1(1– )] = 0 (A1.e)
PtHt + Ct + (1– ) (ht+1 – ht) = [wLt + rht ht + rtb] (1– ) + G (A1.f)
Pt = rht (A1.g)
Ht = ht (A1.h)
The steady-state equilibrium is attained when:  t =  t+1 and ht = ht+1, which im-
plies the following set of equations: 
(1– )1 ~ r = –––––  –––––– (A2.a)
  (1– )
~ rh = ~ r(1– ) (A2.b)
UL + w(1– )UC = 0 (A2.c)
UH –––– = ~ P (A2.d)
UC
~ P ~ H + ~ C = [w~ L + ~ rh 
~ h + ~ rb] (1 –  ) + G (A2.e)
~ P = ~ rh (A2.f)





These long-run equilibrium equations jointly determine the steady-state values of
C, H, L, h, P, r, rh, and  , denoted by the symbol ~. We can solve the system in a very
simple recursive way. First, equation (A2.a) determines the value of in terms of   and  .
An increase in the marginal tax rate will increase the rate of return of government
443 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 2006, ã. 9-10bonds. Equation (A2.b) yields ~ rh interms of ß,  , and  . Once ~ rh is obtained, equation
(A2.f) will determine ~ P. As before, a higher marginal tax rate raises the rate of re-
turn of the per capita stock of housing. Equations (A2.c), (A2.d) and (A2.e) can be
solved jointly to determine the value of  ~ C,  ~ H, ~ L. Replacing ~ C in (A2.h) the value of ~
  is obtained. Once we know  ~ H, then ~ h immediately follows from (A2.g).
Appendix B
We simplify (4.a), (4.b) and (4.c) taking into account that:  
 V  V  M
––– = ––– ––– =   (B1.a)
 G  M  G
 V
where M = rb + G and ––– =  
 M
 ~ L  ~ L
––– = –––  (B1.b)
 G  M
 ~ H  ~ H
––– = –––  (B1.c)
 G  M








Now, we define Z as: Z = w~ L + ~ rb + ~ r(1 –  )~ H so that:
 V




   (1 –  )~ r




 V  V    (1 –  )~ r
⇔ ––– = ––––––––– ––––––––– =  ~ r  ~ H (B1.e)
      (1 –  )~ r   
Finally we have the Slutsky equations:
 ~ L  ~ L
––– = – wSLL – Z ––– (B1.f)
    M
 ~ H  ~ H
––– = ~ r(1 –  )SHH – Z ––– (B1.g)
    M
where SLL and SHH are the substitution terms: SLL is the compensated response of
labor to the net wage and SHH is the compensated response of housing demand to its
net price.
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and (B1.g) and obtain:
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 ––– +  ( [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––] – 1) dF = 0
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~
 ––– +  ([w
~
L + ~ r (1 –  )
~
H + ~ rb] +  [w––– + ~ r (1 –  ) –––] +
        
 ~ r  ~ r
+   ––– [b + (1 –  )
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SUMMARY
JEL codes: H210, H24, R310
Keywords: housing; personal income; optimal taxation
An Optimal Linear Income Tax with a Subsidy 
on Housing
Irene PERROTE – Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha and Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
(irenamaria.perrote@uclm.es)
This paper generalizes the standard model of the optimal linear income tax to in-
clude a subsidy on housing. Unlike previous literature, we start from a dynamic
equilibrium model and examine the steady state equilibrium. We then analyse first
order conditions for our linear tax structure. Given the higher complexity of our mo-
del, some new efficiency effects appear, coming from both the marginal tax rate and
the subsidy on housing.
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